Admissible strategies, i.e. those that are not dominated by any other strategy, are a typical rationality notion in game theory. In many classes of games this is justified by results showing that any strategy is admissible or dominated by an admissible strategy. However, in games played on finite graphs with quantitative objectives (as used for reactive synthesis), this is not the case.
Introduction
The canonical model to formalize the reactive synthesis problem are two-player win/lose perfect information games played on finite (directed) graphs [18, 1] . In recent years, more general objectives and multiplayer games have been studied (see e.g. [14] or [6] and additional references therein). When moving beyond two-player win/lose games, the traditional solution concept of a winning strategy needs to be updated by another notion. The game-theoretic literature offers a variety of concepts of rationality to be considered as candidates. The notion we focus on here is admissibility: roughly speaking, judging strategies according to this criterion allows to deem rational only strategies that are not worse than any other strategy (ie, that are not dominated). In this sense, admissible strategies represent maximal elements in the whole set of strategies available to a player. One attractive feature of admissibility, or more generally, dominance based rationality notions is that they work on the level of an individual agent. Unlike e.g. to justify Nash equilibria, no common rationality, shared knowledge or any other assumptions on the other players are needed to explain why a specific agent would avoid dominated strategies.
The study of admissibility in the context of games played on graphs was initiated by Berwanger in [3] and subsequently became an active research topic (e.g. [10, 8, 2, 7, 9] , see related work below). In [3] , Berwanger established in the context of perfect-information games with boolean objectives that admissibility is the good criterion for rationality: every strategy is either admissible or dominated by an admissible strategy.
Unfortunately, this fundamental property does not hold when one considers quantitative objectives. Indeed, as soon as there are three different possible payoffs, one can find instances of games where a strategy is neither dominated by an admissible strategy, nor admissible itself (see Example 1) . This third payoff actually allows for the existence of infinite domination sequences of strategies, where each element of the sequence dominates its predecessor and is dominated by its successor in the chain. Consequently, no strategy in such a chain is admissible. However, it can be the case that no admissible strategy dominates the elements of the chain. In the absence of a maximal element above these strategies, one may ask why they should be discarded in the quest of a rational choice. They may indeed represent a type of behaviour that is rational but not captured by the admissibility criterion.
Our contributions.
To formalize this behaviour, we study increasing chains of strategies (Definition 3). A chain is weakly dominated by some other chain, if every strategy in the first is below some strategy in the second. The question then arises whether every chain is below a maximal chain. Based on purely order-theoretic argument, a sufficient criterion is given in Theorem 12. However, Corollary 18 shows that our sufficient criterion does not apply to all games of interests. We can avoid the issue by restricting to some countable class of strategies, e.g. just the regular, computable or hyperarithmetic ones (Corollary 20) .
We test the abstract notion in the concrete setting of generalised safety/reachability games (Definition 22). Based on the observation that the crucial behaviour captured by chains of strategies, but not by single strategies is Repeat this action a large but finite number of times, we introduce the notion of a parameterized automaton (Definition 32), which essentially has just this ability over the standard finite automata. We then show that any finite memory strategy is below a maximal chain or strategy realized by a parameterized automaton (Theorem 35).
Finally, we consider some algorithmic properties of chains and parameterized automata in generalised safety/reachability games. It is decidable in PTime whether a parameterized 
Figure 1 The Help-me?-game
In the following, we will always focus on the point of view of one player i, thus we will sometimes refer to him as the protagonist and assume it is the first player, while the other players −i can be seen as a coalition and abstracted to a single player, that we will call the antagonist. Furthermore, we will omit the subscript i to refer to the protagonist when we use the notations aVal i , cVal i , acV al i , p i , etc.. Let us first look at the possible behaviours of the protagonist in this game, when he makes no assumption on the payoff function of the antagonist. He can choose to be "optimistic" and opt to try (at least for some time, or forever) to go to v 1 in the hope that the antagonist will cooperate to bring him to 2 , or settle from the start and go directly to 1 , not counting on any help from the antagonist. We denote by s k the strategy that prescribes to choose v 1 as the successor vertex at the first k visits of v 0 , and 1 at the k + 1-th visit, while s ω denotes the strategy that prescribes v 1 at every visit of v 0 . Note that at history q 0 , the strategy s ω is cooperative optimal but not worst-case optimal (as the protagonist takes the risk to get a payoff of 0 by staying forever in the loop q 0 q 1 ), while the strategy s 0 that goes directly to 1 is worst-case optimal but not cooperative optimal. On the other hand, strategies s k for k > 0 are worst-case cooperative optimal at q 0 : they allow the antagonist to help reaching 2 but also ensure the payoff 1 by not letting the protagonist loop indefinitely in q 0 q 1 
In addition, we observe that s ω is admissible: for any strategy s k , the strategy τ of the antagonist that moves to 2 at the k + 1-th visit of v 1 yields a payoff of 1 against strategy s k but 2 against strategy s ω . Thus,
Quantitative vs Boolean setting. Remark that in the boolean variant of the Help-me? game considered in Example 1, where the payoff associated with the vertex 1 is 0 and the payoff associated with the vertex 2 is 1, every strategy s k for k ∈ N is in fact dominated by s ω , as s k and s ω both yield payoff 0 against τ such that τ ((v 0 v 1 ) k ) = v 0 for all k ∈ N. In fact, Berwanger in [3] , showed that boolean games with ω-regular objectives enjoy the following fundamental property: every strategy is either admissible, or dominated by an admissible strategy. The existence of an admissible strategy in any such game follows as an immediate corollary.
Let us now illustrate how admissibility fails to capture fully the notion of rational behaviour in the quantitative case. Firstly, recall that the existence of admissible strategies is not guaranteed in this setting (see for instance the examples given in [8] ). In [8] , the authors identified a class of games for which the existence of admissible strategies (for Player i) is guaranteed: well-formed games (for Player i). However, even in such games, the desirable fundamental property that holds for boolean games is not assured to hold anymore. In fact, this is already true for quantitative well-formed games with only three different payoffs and really simple payoff functions. Indeed, consider again the Help-me? game in Figure 1 . Remark that it is a well-formed game for the protagonist. We already showed that any strategy s k is dominated by the strategy s k+1 . Thus, none of them is admissible. The only admissible strategy is s ω . It is easy to see that s k s ω for any k ∈ N:
To sum up, we see that there exists an infinite sequence (s k ) k∈N of strategies such that none of its elements is dominated by the only admissible strategy s ω . However, the sequence (s k ) k∈N is totally ordered by the dominance relation. Based on these observations, we take the approach to not only consider single strategies, but also such ordered sequences of strategies, that can represent a type of rational behaviour not captured by the admissibility concept.
Order theory
In this paragraph we recall the standard results from order theory that we need (see e.g. [16] ).
A linear order is a total, transitive and antisymmetric relation. A linearly ordered set (R, ≺) is a well-order, if every subset of R has a minimal element w.r.t. ≺. The ordinals are the canonical examples of well-orders, in as far as any well-order is order-isomorphic to an ordinal. The ordinals themselves are well-ordered by the relation < where α ≤ β iff α order-embeds into β. The first infinite ordinal is denoted by ω, and the first uncountable ordinal by ω 1 .
A quasi order is a transitive and reflexive relation. Let (X, ) be a quasi-ordered set. A chain in (X, ) is a subset of X that is totally ordered by . An increasing chain is an ordinal-indexed family (x β ) β<α of elements of X such that β < γ < α ⇒ x β ≺ x γ . If we only have that β < γ implies x β x γ , we speak of a weakly increasing chain. We are mostly interested in (weakly) increasing chains in this paper, and will thus occasionally suppress the words weakly increasing and only speak about chains.
A subset Y of a quasi-ordered set (X, ) is called cofinal, if for every x ∈ X there is a y ∈ Y with x y. A consequence of the axiom of choice is that every chain contains a cofinal increasing chain, which is one reason for our focus on increasing chains. It is obvious that having multiple maximal elements prevents the existence of a cofinal chain, but even a lattice can fail to admit a cofinal chain. An example we will go back to is ω 1 × ω (cf. [16] ).
If (X, ) admits a cofinal chain, then its cofinality (denoted by cof(X, )) is the least ordinal α indexing a cofinal increasing chain in (X, ). The possible values of the cofinality are 1 or infinite regular cardinals (it is common to identify a cardinal and the least ordinal of that cardinality). In particular, a countable chain can only have cofinality 1 or ω. The first uncountable cardinal ℵ 1 is regular, and cof(ω 1 ) = ω 1 .
We will need the probably most-famous result from order theory:
Lemma 2 (Zorn's Lemma). If every chain in (X, ) has an upper bound, then every element of X is below a maximal element.
3
Increasing chains of strategies
Ordering chains
In this subsection, we study the quasi-order of increasing chains in a given quasiorder (X, ). We denote by IC(X, ) the set of increasing chains in (X, ). Our intended application will be that (X, ) is the set of strategies for the protagonist in a game ordered by the dominance relation. However, in this subsection we are not exploiting any properties specific to the game-setting. Instead, our approach is purely order-theoretic.
Definition 3.
We introduce an order on IC(X, ) by defining:
Note that is a partial order. Let . = denote the corresponding equivalence relation. We will occasionally write short IC for (IC(X, ), ).
Inspired by our application to dominance between strategies in games, we will refer to both and as the dominance relation, and might express e.g.
There is no risk to confuse whether or is meant, since x y iff (x) β<1 (y) γ<1 . Continuing the identification of x ∈ X and (x) β<1 ∈ IC, we will later also speak about a single strategy dominating a chain or vice versa.
The central notion we are interested in will be that of a maximal chain:
We desire situations where every chain in IC is either maximal or below a maximal chain. Noting that this goal is precisely the conclusion of Zorn's Lemma (Lemma 2), we are led to study chains of chains; for if every chain of chains is bounded, Zorn's Lemma applies. Since (IC, ) is a quasiorder just as (X, ) is, notions such as cofinality apply to chains of chains just as they apply to chains. We will gather a number of lemmas we need to clarify when chains of chains are bounded.
In a slight abuse of notation, we write (
We can now express cofinality by noting that (x β ) β<α is cofinal in (y γ ) γ<δ iff (x β ) β<α ⊆ (y γ ) γ<δ and (y γ ) γ<δ (x β ) β<α . We recall that the cofinality of (y γ ) γ<δ (denoted by cof((y γ ) γ<δ ) is the least ordinal α such that there exists some (x β ) β<α which is cofinal in (y γ ) γ<δ .
Proof. For each x β , let γ β = min{γ | x β y γ }. By assumption, the set on the right hand side is non-empty; and as it is a set of ordinals, it has a minimum. The set {y γ β | β < α} is well-ordered by (as a subset of a well-ordered set). Hence it can be turned into an increasing chain (y λ ) λ<α . By construction, we have (y λ ) λ<α ⊆ (y γ ) γ<δ and (x β ) β<α (y λ ) λ<α . By transitivity, it follows that (y λ ) λ<α . = (y γ ) γ<δ . It remains to argue that α ≤ α. For that, consider the map λ → min{β | y γ β = y λ }. This map is well-defined, injective and preserves ≤. Thus, it constitutes an order-homeomorphism from α to α, and witnesses that α ≤ α. We briefly illustrate the concepts introduced so far in the game setting. Notice that for a game G and a Player i, the pair (Σ i (G), ) is indeed a quasi-ordered set. We can thus consider the set IC(Σ i (G), ) of increasing chains of strategies in G.
Example 9.
Recall the Help-me? game of Figure 1 and consider the set (Σ i , ) of strategies of the protagonist ordered by the weak dominance relation. Any single strategy is an increasing chain, indexed by the ordinal 1. We already noted that the strategy s ω is admissible, thus the chain consisting of s ω is maximal with respect to . Furthermore, the sequence of strategies (s k ) k<ω is an increasing chain. Indeed, we know that for any k < ω, we have s k ≺ s k+1 . It is a maximal one: in fact, since the set of strategies of the protagonist solely consists of the strategies of this chain and s ω , and as s k s ω for any k < ω, we get that any chain (
β<α be an increasing chain indexed by the ordinal α. First, remark that α ≤ ω. If α < ω, then the cofinality of (σ β ) β<α is 1 as (σ β ) β<α is equivalent to the strategy σ α−1 . If α = ω, then the cofinality of (σ β ) β<α is ω: As for every finite chain (σ β ) β <α with 1 < α < ω, there exists n < ω such that (σ β ) β <α σ n , and thus (σ β ) β<α is not (weakly) dominated by (σ β ) β <α . Moreover, we have that (σ β ) β<α . = (s k ) k<ω and is thus maximal. Indeed, since (σ β ) β<α is a chain that is not a singleton, we already know that
β<α is an increasing chain and α = ω, we have that there exists n < ω and k ≥ k such that σ n = s k . Thus, s k σ n since (s k ) k<ω is an increasing chain. Hence, we also have (s k ) k<ω (σ β ) β<α . Now we are ready to prove the main technical result of this section 3.1, which identifies the potential obstructions for each chain in IC to have an upper bound:
Lemma 10. The following are equivalent:
γ<δ is an increasing chain in IC, then it has an upper bound in IC.
If ((x
Proof. It is clear that 2 is a special case of 1. We thus just need to show that any potential obstruction to 1 can be assumed to have the form in 2.
By replacing each (x γ β ) β<αγ with some suitable cofinal increasing chain if necessary, we can assume that cof((
If this set is cofinal in ((x γ β ) β<αγ ) γ<δ , then for each γ inside that set pick some witness γ , and let y γ be the witness obtained from Lemma 8. Now {y γ | ∃γ > γ α γ < α γ } is the desired upper bound.
If the set from the paragraph above is not cofinal, then there exists some δ < δ such that for δ ≤ γ < γ < δ we always have that α γ ≥ α γ . As the α γ are ordinals, decreases can happen only finitely many times. Thus, by moving to a suitable cofinal subset we can safely assume that all α γ are equal to some fixed α.
Again by moving to a suitable cofinal subset, we can assume that cof(
) γ<δ is the desired upper bound. It remains to handle the case α = δ > 1.
We construct some function f : α → α, such that the desired upper bound (y ) <α is of the form y = x f ( ) . We proceed as follows: Set f (0) = 0. Once f (ζ) has been defined for
Thus, it has some upper bound, and we define f ( ) such that x f ( ) is such an upper bound.
Let us illustrate the problem of extending Lemma 10 by an example: However, we can guarantee the existence of a maximal chain above any chain when there is no uncountable increasing chain of increasing chains.
Theorem 12. If all increasing chains of elements in IC (i.e., increasing chains of increasing chains of elements of (X, )) have a countable number of elements, then for every A ∈ IC there exists a maximal B ∈ IC with A B.
Proof. We first argue that Condition 2 in Lemma 10 is vacuously true. As all increasing chains in IC are countable, the only possible value δ > 1 for
As (X, ) embeds into IC, if all chains in IC are countable, then so are all chains in (X, ). This tells us that the only possible value for α is α = ω. But then α = δ cannot be satisfied.
By Lemma 10, Condition 1 follows. We can then apply Zorn's Lemma (Lemma 2) to conclude the claim.
A small modification of the example shows that we cannot replace the requirement that IC has only countable increasing chains in Theorem 12 with the simpler requirement that (X, ) has only countable increasing chains:
Example 13. Let X = ω 1 × ω, and let (α, n) ≺ (β, m) iff α ≤ β and n < m. Then (X, ) has only countable increasing chains, but IC still has the chain of chains given by x γ n = (γ, n) as in Example 11. 
Uncountably long chains of chains
Unfortunately, we can design a game such that there exists an uncountable increasing chain of increasing chains. Thus the existence of a maximal element above any chain is not guaranteed by Theorem 12. In fact, we will see that the chain of chains of uncountable length we construct is not below any maximal chain.
Example 14.
We consider a variant of the Help-me? game (Example 1), depicted in Figure 2a . The strategies of the protagonist in this game can be described by functions f : N → N ∪ {∞} describing how often the protagonist is willing to repeat the second loop (between q 1 and q 2 ) given the number of repetitions the antagonist made in the first loop (at q 0 ). With the same reasoning as in Example 1 we find that the strategy corresponding to a function g dominates the strategy corresponding to
Observation 16.
There is an embedding of (N N , ≤) into the strategies of the game in Example 14 ordered by dominance such that no strategy in the range of embedding is dominated by a strategy outside the range of the embedding.
Proof. For each countable limit ordinal α, we fix 
Proof. It suffices to show that if α ≤ β, then f α n ≤ f β n for all n greater than some t. If β = α + 1, this is immediate already for t = 0. For β a limit ordinal, we note that f
The claim then follows by induction over β. Recall that if β is a limit ordinal and α < β, then there is some m ∈ ω with α ≤ β [m] . Since for any given α, β, the ordinals γ between α and β we will need to inspect in the induction form a decreasing chain, there are only finitely many such ordinals. In particular, the maximum of all thresholds t we encounter is well-defined.
Proof. Due to transitivity of and the previous claim, it suffices to show that (f
Assume the contrary, i.e. that for all n < ω there exists some m < ω such that for all k ∈ N and for all j ≤ k we have that g n+j (k) + 1 ≤ g m (k). In particular, for n = 0 we would have that ∀k ∈ N ∀j ≤ k g j (k) + 1 ≤ g m (k), and then setting
, which is a contradiction.
Corollary 18. The game in Example 14 has uncountably long chains of chains not below any maximal chains.
Proof. Combine Observation 16 and Proposition 17.
Chains over countable quasiorders (X, )
Our proof of Proposition 17 crucially relied on functions of type f : N → N with arbitrarily high rate of growth. In concrete applications such functions would typically be unwelcome. In fact, for almost all classes of games of interest in (theoretical) computer science, a countable collection of strategies suffices for the players to attain their attainable goals. Restricting to computable strategies often makes sense. Many games played on finite graphs are even finite-memory determined (see [15] for how this extends to the quantitative case), and thus strategies implementable by finite automata are all that need to be considered.
Restricting consideration to a countable set of strategies indeed circumvents the obstacle presented by Proposition 17. The reason is that the cardinality of the length of a chain of chains cannot exceed that of the underlying quasiorder (X, ):
Corollary 20. If (X, ) is countable, then any increasing chain is maximal or below a maximal chain.
Proof. Proposition 19 shows that Theorem 12 applies.
Example 21. We return to the Help-me? game (Example 1, Figure 1 ). With the analysis done in Example 9, we have seen that any increasing chain C is either maximal or such that C (σ n ) n<ω , which is maximal. This fact can be derived directly from Corollary 20 as the number of strategies in G is countable. Note also that the seemingly irrelevant loop we added in Figure 2a has a fundamental impact on the behaviour of chains of strategies!
4
Generalised safety/reachability games Definition 22. A generalised safety/reachability game (for Player i) G = P, G, L, (p i ) i∈P is a turn-based multiplayer game on a finite graph such that:
L ⊆ V is a finite set of leaves, for each ∈ L, we have that ( , v) ∈ E if, and only if v = , that is, each leaf is equipped with a self-loop, and no other outgoing transition, for each ∈ L, there exists an associated payoff n ∈ Z such that: for each outcome ρ,
The traditional reachability games can be recovered as the special case where all leaves are associated with the same positive payoff, whereas the traditional safety games are those generalised safety/reachability games with a single negative payoff attached to leaves. This class was studied under the name chess-like games in [4, 5] .
Generalised safety/reachability games are well-formed for Player i. Furthermore, they are prefix-independent, that is, for any outcome ρ and history h, we have that
Without loss of generality, we consider that there is either a unique leaf (n) ∈ L or no leaf for each possible payoff n ∈ Z.
It follows from the transfer theorem in [15] (in fact, already from the weaker transfer theorem in [11] ) that generalised safety/reachability games are finite memory determined. With a slight modification, we see that for any history h and strategy σ, there exists a finite-memory strategy σ such that cVal(h, σ ) = cVal(h, σ) and aVal(h, σ ) = aVal(h, σ). We shall thus restrict our attention to finite memory strategies, of which there are only countably many. We then obtain immediately from Corollary 20:
Corollary 23. In a generalised safety/reachability game, every increasing chain comprised of finite memory strategies is either maximal or dominated by a maximal such chain.
If our goal is only to obtain a dominance-related notion of rationality, then for generalised safety/reachability games we can be satisfied with maximal chains comprised of finite memory strategies. However, for applications, it would be desirable to have a concrete understanding of these maximal chains. For this, having used Zorn's Lemma in the proof of their existence surely is a bad omen! After collecting some useful lemmas on dominance in generalised safety/reachability games in Section 4.1, we will introduce the notion of uniform chains in Section 4.2. These are realized by automata of a certain kind, and thus sufficiently concrete to be amenable to algorithmic manipulations. 
Dominance in generalised safety/reachability games
Intuitively, if there is no history where the two strategies disagree, they are in fact equivalent, and if, at every history where they disagree, the best payoff σ 1 can achieve (that is, cVal(h, σ 1 )) is less than the one σ 2 can ensure (that is, aVal(h, σ 2 )), then σ 1 σ 2 . On the other hand, if they disagree at a history h and the best payoff σ 1 can achieve is strictly greater than the one σ 2 can ensure, then there exist a strategy of the antagonist that will yield exactly these payoffs against σ 1 and σ 2 respectively, which means that σ 1 σ 2 . This result follows from the proof of Theorem 11 in [8] . The proof adapted to our setting can be found in the appendix.
Proof of Lemma 24.=⇒
. Let τ be a strategy of player −i compatible with h, and define τ (h ) =
, since generalised safety/reachability games are prefix-independent. Thus, σ 1 σ 2 .
We call such a history h a non-dominance witness of σ 1 by σ 2 . The existence of nondominance witnesses allows us to conclude that in generalised safety/reachability games, all increasing chains are countable (not just those comprised of finite memory strategies).
Corollary 25. If (σ β ) β<α is an increasing chain in generalised safety/reachability game, then α is countable.
Proof. Assume that a history h is a witness of non-dominance of σ 2 by σ 1 , and of σ 3 by σ 2 , but not of σ 3 ) . Thus, if there are k different possible values, then any increasing chain of strategies using h as witness of non-dominance between them can have length at most 2k − 1.
But if there were an uncountably long increasing chain, by the pigeon hole principle it would have an uncountably long subchain where all non-dominance witnesses in the reverse direction are given by the same history.
As we only handle countable chains, in the following we use the usual notation (σ n ) n∈N to index chains.
The following lemma states that we can also extract witnesses for a strategy to be non-maximal (non-admissible or strictly dominated): This result is a reformulation of Theorem 11 in [8] 
Proof of Lemma 26. ⇐ Let σ h be a strategy compatible with h such that aVal(h, σ h ) = aVal(h) and cVal(h, σ h ) = acVal(h). Let σ be the strategy that follows σ and switches
there is a strict inequality in aVal(h, σ) ≤ cVal(h, σ) ≤ aVal(h) ≤ acVal(h). Hence, there exists τ such that
⇒ Let σ be such that σ ≺ σ . In particular, σ σ . By Lemma 24, we know that there exists a history h compatible with σ and σ such that last(h) ∈ V i , σ(h) = σ(h) and cVal(h, σ) ≤ aVal(h, σ ). Since the domination is strict between σ and σ , we further know that the sequence of inequalities aVal(h, σ) ≤ cVal(h, σ) ≤ aVal(h, σ ) ≤ cVal(h, σ ) with at least one strict inequality holds. Towards contradiction, we assume that the chain of inequalities aVal(h, σ) ≤ cVal(h, σ) ≤ aVal(h) ≤ acVal(h) where at least one inequality is strict does not hold.
That is, either aVal(h, σ) = cVal(h, σ) = aVal(h) = acVal(h) or cVal(h, σ) > aVal(h). Suppose that aVal(h, σ) = cVal(h, σ) = aVal(h) = acVal(h). As aVal(h, σ ) ≤ aVal(h), we have that aVal(h, σ) = cVal(h, σ) = aVal(h, σ ) < cVal(h, σ ). Since σ guarantees aVal(h), we know that cVal(h, σ ) ≤ acVal(h). Thus acVal(h) = aVal(h) < cVal(h, σ ) ≤ acVal(h), which is a contradiction. Suppose now that cVal(h, σ) > aVal(h). As aVal(h, σ ) ≤ aVal(h), it follows that cVal(h, σ) > aVal(h, σ ), which contradicts the fact that cVal(h, σ) ≤ aVal(h, σ ).

Definition 27. Call a history h as in Lemma 26 a non-admissibility witness for σ. Call σ preadmissible, if for every non-admissibility witness hv of σ we find that h = h vh with aVal(h v, σ) = aVal(h v) and cVal(h v, σ) = acV al(h v).
While a preadmissible strategy may fail to be admissible, it is not possible to improve upon it the first time it enters some vertex. Only when returning to a vertex later it may make suboptimal choices. Moreover, before a dominated choice is possible at a vertex, previously both the antagonistic and the antagonistic-cooperative value were realized at that vertex by the preadmissible strategy.
Lemma 28. In a generalised safety/reachability game, every strategy is either preadmissible or dominated by a preadmissible strategy.
Proof. For each vertex v in the game, we fix a finite memory strategy τ v that realizes aVal(v) and acV al (v) . Note that since generalised safety/reachability games are prefix independent, values depend only on the current vertex, but not on the entire history.
We start with a finite memory strategy σ. If it is not already preadmissible, then it has witnesses of non-admissibility violating the desired property. Whether a history h is a witness of non-admissibility for a finite memory strategy σ depends only on the last vertex of h and the current state of σ. We now modify σ such that whenever σ is in a combination of vertex v and state s corresponding to a problematic witness of non-admissibility, the new strategy σ moves to playing τ v instead. The choices of v, s and τ k ensure that σ dominates σ. The new strategy σ may fail to be preadmissible, again, and we repeat the construction. Now any problematic history in σ needs to enter the automaton for some τ v at some point. By choice of τ v , the history where τ v has just been entered cannot be a witness of nonadmissibility. It follows that a problematic history entering τ v cannot end in v. Repeating the updating process for at most as many times as there are vertices in the game graph will yield a preadmissible finite memory strategy dominating σ.
Lemma 29. If h is not a witness of non-admissibility of σ, and not a witness of nondominance of σ by τ , then h is not a witness of non-dominance of τ by σ.
Proof of Lemma 29. To even be a candidate for a witness of non-dominance of τ by σ, h needs to be compatible with σ and τ and satisfy last(h) ∈ V 1 , σ(h) = τ (h). Not being a witness of non-dominance of σ by τ then implies cVal(h, σ) ≤ aVal(h, τ ). It follows in particular that aVal(h, σ) ≤ cVal(h, σ) ≤ aVal(h, τ ) ≤ aVal(h) ≤ acVal(h). The only way h can not be a witness of non-admissibility of σ is if aVal(h, σ) = cVal(h, σ) = aVal(h, τ ) = aVal(h) = acVal(h). Since aVal(h, τ ) = aVal(h), it follows that cVal(h, τ ) ≤ acVal(h, τ ) = aVal(σ), i.e. h is not a witness of non-dominance of τ by σ.
Lemma 30. Given an initialized game with initial vertex v 0 , the following holds: If for two strategies σ and τ it holds that for any maximal history h compatible with both, there is a prefix h with aVal(h , σ) = aVal(h , τ ) and cVal(h
Proof. Assume for the sake of a contradiction that aVal(v 0 , σ) < aVal(v 0 , τ ). Then there is a real r ∈ R, and a strategy π of the antagonist such that for any strategy π of the antagonist p(Out(σ, π)) < r ≤ p (Out(τ, π ) ). If Out(σ, π) = Out(τ, π), this is clearly impossible. Thus, Out(σ, π) and Out(τ, π) have some longest common prefix h, which is a maximal history compatible with σ and τ (for it must be the protagonist who behaves differently first in Out(σ, π) and Out(τ, π) ).
By assumption, h has a prefix h with aVal(h , σ) = aVal(h , τ ). Now aVal(h , σ) ≤ p(Out(σ, π)) < r.
If aVal(h , τ ) < r, then the antagonist must have a strategy π such that h is a prefix of Out(τ, π ) and p(Out(τ, π )) < r. But that contradictions r ≤ p (Out(τ, π ) ) holding for all π .
The proof for the cooperative value in place of the antagonistic one proceeds analogously.
Lemma 31. Given an initialized game with initial vertex v 0 , the following holds: If σ is preadmissible and σ τ , then aVal(v
Proof. We show that the conditions of Lemma 30 are satisfied, which will imply our desired conclusion. Consider a maximal history h compatible with both σ and τ . First, assume that h is not a witness of non-admissibility of σ. Since σ τ , by Lemma 24 h cannot be a witness of non-dominance of σ by τ , i.e. cVal(h, σ) ≤ aVal(h, τ ). By Lemma 29, it follows that h is not a witness of non-dominance of τ by σ either, i.e. cVal(h, τ ) ≤ aVal(h, σ). Put together, we have aVal(h, σ) = cVal(h, σ) = aVal(h, τ ) = cVal(h, τ ).
It remains the case where h is a witness of non-admissibility of σ. Then by preadmissibility of σ, h has some prefix h with aVal(h , σ) = aVal(h ) and cVal(h , σ) = acVal(h ). Since σ τ , we must have aVal(h , σ) ≤ aVal(h , τ ), so it follows that aVal(h , σ) = aVal(h , τ ), and then that cVal(h , τ ) ≤ acVal(h ) = cVal(h , σ) ≤ cVal(h , τ ), i.e. cVal(h , σ) = cVal(h , τ ).
Parameterized automata and uniform chains
Let a parameterized automaton be a Mealy automaton that in addition can access a single counter in the following way: In a counter-access-state, a transition is chosen based on whether the counter value is 0 or not. Otherwise, the counter is decremented by 1. To ease presentation and understanding, we call transitions that decrement the counter green transitions, the transitions only taken when the counter value is 0 red transitions, and the ones that do not depend on the counter value black transitions. This classification between green, red and black transitions extends naturally to the edges of the product M × G (that is, the graph with set of vertices M × V and edges induced by the functions µ and ν).
Parameterized automata can be seen as a collection of finite Mealy automata, one for each initialization of the counter. Thus, we say that a parameterized automaton M realizes a sequence of finite-memory strategies (σ n ) n∈N . In the remainder of the paper, we focus on chains realized by parameterized automata:
Definition 33. Let a chain (σ n ) n∈N of regular strategies be called a uniform chain if there is a parameterized automaton M that realizes σ n if the counter is initialized with the value n. If (σ n ) n∈N is maximal for amongst the increasing chains comprised of finite memory strategies, we call it a a maximal uniform chain.
Example 34. The Help-me? game from Figure 1 is clearly a generalised safety/reachability game with two leaves. The chain of strategies (s k ) k∈N exposed in Example 1 is a uniform chain, as it is realized by the parameterized automaton that loops k times when its counter is initialized with value k. Figure 3 shows the product between this parameterized automaton and the game graph. The green edge corresponds to the transition to take when the counter value is greater than 0 and should be decremented, while the red edge corresponds to the transition to take when the counter value is 0. The following theorem shows us that uniform chains indeed suffice to realize any rational behaviour in the sense of maximal chains:
Theorem 35. In a generalised safety/reachability game, every dominated finite memory strategy is dominated by an admissible finite memory strategy or by a maximal uniform chain.
Proof. By Lemma 28 it suffices to prove the claim for preadmissible strategies (Definition 27). We thus start with a preadmissible finite memory strategy σ.
By the prefix-independence of generalised safety/reachability games, for any combination of vertex v in the game and state s in the automaton realizing σ, either a history ending in v and state s is a witness for non-admissibility of σ or not. Let N be the set of such pairs corresponding to non-admissibility witnesses. By the definition of preadmissibility, we cannot reach any (v, s) ∈ N without first passing through some (v, s It remains to argue that the strategy/uniform chain realized by M is maximal. Let σ n be the strategy where M is initialized with n ∈ N (wlog assume that n is larger than the size of M). Assume that τ σ n , and let h be a witness of τ σ n according to Lemma 24, i.e. satisfying cVal(h,
with one inequality being strict. In particular, h is a witness of non-admissibility of σ n . By construction of M, h must already have been a witness of non-admissibility of σ, and the next move after h must be given by a red edge. This already implies that if M realizes a single strategy, then that strategy is maximal.
Let m be the size of the parameterized automaton M, let t be the size of the automaton realizing τ , and N = mt + 1. We compare σ N and τ by considering the maximal histories compatible with both. If there were such a history hv compatible with both σ N and τ where σ N is about to apply a red edge, then it has to hold that on histories extending hv, τ always acts at v as M does following a green edge, for τ cannot count up to N (in particular, h is maximal for being compatible with τ and σ N ). It follows that aVal(hv, τ ) ≤ 0. Let h v be a prefix of this form of hv compatible with σ n not ending in a red edge (this exists, since n > m). Then aVal(h v, τ ) ≤ 0, and since τ σ n , aVal(h v, σ n ) = aVal(v, s i v ) ≤ 0. But then when constructing M, we would not have placed red and green edges at (v, s i v ), leading to a contradiction. Thus, at any maximal history compatible with σ N and τ , σ N will follow a green or black edge next.
If τ is part of a chain (τ i ) i∈N with (σ i ) i∈N (τ i ) i∈N , then τ and σ N have a common upper bound τ . If some maximal history h compatible with both σ N and τ is not compatible with τ , then h has a longest prefix h compatible with τ . If h is compatible with τ , but τ (h) = σ N (h), we set h = h. As shown above, h cannot be a witness of non-admissibility of σ N , and by Lemma 24 it cannot be a witness of non-dominance of σ N by τ , since σ N τ . Lemma 29 then gives us that h is not a witness of non-dominance of τ by σ N , i.e. cVal(h , τ ) ≤ aVal(h , σ N ). Together with σ N τ we get that aVal(h , σ N ) = cVal(h , σ N ). Since h is compatible with σ N and extends h , it follows that aVal(h ,
is not a witness of non-dominance of τ by σ N .
The remaining case we need to consider is that where h is compatible with τ and τ (h) = σ N (h). Consider the subgame starting after that move. Since we have chosen N sufficiently big, in this subgame it is impossible for σ N to pass through a red edge without passing through a green edge at the same vertex. By construction, this ensures that σ N is still preadmissible in this subgame. Since reaching the subgame is compatible with τ and σ N , restricting to this subgame, we still have that σ N τ . Thus, we can apply Lemma 31 to the subgame, and conclude that aVal(h, τ ) = aVal(h, σ N ) and cVal(h, τ ) = cVal(h, σ N ). Since h cannot be a witness of non-dominance of τ by τ , it holds that cVal(h, τ ) ≤ aVal(h, τ ) = aVal(h, σ N ). Thus, h is not a witness of non-dominance of τ by σ N either.
As we have ruled out all candidates for witnesses of non-dominance of τ by σ N , by Lemma 24 we may conclude that τ σ N .
Theorem 35 cannot be extended to state that every chain comprised of finite memory strategies is below an admissible strategy or a maximal uniform chain. Note that there are only countably many uniform chains.
Example 36. There is a generalised safety/reachability game where there are uncountably many incomparable maximal chains of finite memory strategies. Figure 2b . For any p ∈ {a, b} ω , define a chain of finite memory strategies by letting the n-strategy be loop n times while playing the symbols from p ≤n , then quit. For each p, we obtain a different maximal chain.
Proof. Consider the game depicted in
The particular structure of parameterized automata over safety/reachability game graphs lets us point out useful properties and patterns, that we present before tackling algorithmic properties in the next section. Notice that for each pathh in M × G, there exists a unique corresponding path h in G, as there may exist a transition between (m, v) and (m , v ) in M × G only if (v, v ) ∈ E, by definition of the product.
Definition 37. Let G be a generalised safety/reachability game and M be a parameterized automaton over the game graph G. Then, we say that a (finite or infinite) pathh in the product M × G is valid if it respects the following two conditions:
1. there is a finite number of green transitions inh, and 2. no green transition appears after a red transition inh. If a pathh is valid then there exists a strategy in the sequence realized by M that is compatible with the corresponding path h in G. Furthermore, ifh does not contain any red transition, then h is compatible with an infinite number of histories in the sequence, namely all strategies corresponding to the counter initialized to a value greater than the number of green transitions inh. ⇒ Assume that the history h is compatible with σ k .
1.
If |h| r = 0, and k < |h| g , then there exists n < |h| such that |h ≤n | g = k and σ k (h ≤n ) = ν(h n , 0). Sinceh is a valid path, by condition 2. in Definition 37, we have thath n+1 = (µ(h n , 1), ν(h n , 1)). Hence h n+1 = ν(h n , 1) and we have that
That is, h is not compatible with σ k which is a contradiction. 2. If |h| r > 0, and k = |h| g , we have two cases: If k < |h| g , there exists a smallest n < |h| such that |h ≤n | g = k, and σ k (h ≤n ) = ν(h n , 0). Sinceh is a valid path and k < |h| g , by condition 2. in Definition 37, we have thath n+1 = (µ(h n , 1), ν(h n , 1)). Hence h n+1 = ν(h n , 1) and we have that
That is, h is not compatible with σ k which is a contradiction. If k > |h| g , there exists a smallest n < |h| such thath n+1 = (µ(h n , 0), ν(h n , 0)). Since k > |h| g , we have that
That is, h is not compatible with σ k which is a contradiction. ⇐ 1. Assume |h| r = 0 and k ≥ |h| g . Then for all n < |h| such thath n ∈ M ×V i , we have that
(that is, the counter value cannot have been decremented k times by followingh) . As h 0 = (m 0 , v 0 ), it follows thath is indeed compatible with σ k . 2. Assume |h| r > 0 and k = |h| g . Recall thath can be decomposed inh ghr where |h g | r = 0 and |h r | g = 0, such that (h r ) 0 = (µ(last(h g ), 0), ν(last(h g ), 0)). As |h g | g = |h| g = k by case 1. above, we know that h g is compatible with σ k . Furthermore, the counter value at last(h g ) is 0 when initialized at k. Thus, for all |h g | ≤ n < |h| such that h n ∈ M × V i , we have thath n+1 = (µ(h n , 0), ν(h n , 0)). Consequently, we also have that σ k (h n ) = ν(h n , 0) = h n+1 (that is, the counter value has reached 0 afterh g and then followsh r ). Ash 0 = (m 0 , v 0 ), it follows thath is indeed compatible with σ k .
Algorithmic properties
In this section, we prove two decidability results concerning parametrized automata. First, we prove that we can decide whether the sequence of strategies realized by a parameterized automaton is a chain. Note that this decision problem is not trivial: not every parameterized automaton realizes an (increasing) chain of strategies. For instance, if we switch the red and green transitions in the automaton/game graph product of figure 3 , the sequence of strategies realized consists of s ω when the counter is initialized with value 0, and s 0 when it is initialized with any other value. As s ω s 0 , it is not a chain.
Second, we demonstrate that we can compare uniform chains: given two parametrized automata defining chains of strategies, we can decide whether one is dominated by the other. We begin by proving that strategies realized by Mealy automata are comparable.
We now expose equivalences between the decision problems we are interested in, and properties (P 1 ), (P 2 ), (P 3 ) and (P 4 ) that can be decided with the use of Lemma 39.
Proposition 40. Let G be a generalised safety/reachability game over a graph G. Let M be a Mealy automaton realizing a finite memory strategy M , and let S and T be parameterized automata realizing sequences (S n ) n∈N and (T n ) n∈N of finite memory strategies. Then:
Then (S n ) n∈N is a chain if and only if (
Then (S n ) n∈N is an increasing chain if and only if ( Proof. Let n 1 , n 2 > |G||M|, and let us suppose that T n1 T n2 . By Lemma 24, we know that there exists a non-dominance witness h of T n1 by T n2 , i.e., a history h compatible with T n1 and T n2 such that T n1 (h) = T n2 (h) and cVal(h, T n1 ) > aVal(h, T n2 ). We expose an integer k ≤ |G||M| such that for every i ∈ N, we are able to construct, based on h, a non-dominance witness of T n1+(i−1)k by T n2+(i−1)k .
Leth 1 , respectivelyh 2 , be the valid path of G × M corresponding to the history h and the initial counter values n 1 , respectively n 2 . By supposition, both n 1 and n 2 are strictly greater than |G||M|. As a consequence, since T n1 and T n2 have an identical behaviour as long as both have not emptied their counter, and they disagree on the history h, there exists a common prefixh ofh 1 andh 2 such that |h | g = |G||M| + 1 and |h | r = 0. Since |h | g = |G||M|, there exists a state (v, m) ∈ G × M that appears at least twice inh just after using a green transition. This repetition yields a decompositionh ahbhc ofh such that last(h a ) = last(h b ) = (v, m), and 0 1) k , and since G is prefix-independent, the payoff of these outcomes are equal. As a con-
In particular, if we let h be the history such that h a h b h c h = h, we obtain
Proof of Proposition 40.1 and 40.2. Let G be a generalised safety/reachability game, and let S be a parametrized automaton over the game graph of G. We denote by (S n ) n∈N the sequence of finite-memory strategies realized by S. Let N = |G||S|. and N ≺ = |G||S| + (|G||S|)!.
Let U S denote the set composed of the integers n satisfying S n S n+1 . It is clear that if U S is not empty, then (S n ) n∈N is not a chain. Conversely, if U S is empty, then (S n ) n∈N is a chain, since for every pair of integers n 1 < n 2 , we have S n1 S n1+1 . . . S n2 . Let us suppose, towards building a contradiction, that the minimal element m of U S is strictly greater than N . Then, we obtain from Lemma 41 that there exists an integer k > 0 such that S m−k S m−k+1 by setting i = 0. This contradicts the minimality of m. As a consequence, m ≤ N . This proves that (S n ) n∈N is a chain if and only if S i S i+1 for every
Let V S be the set of integers n satisfying S n+1 S n . As before, we obtain that (S n ) n∈N is an increasing chain if and only if U S ∪ V S is empty. 
. We claim that from h N T we are able to construct non-dominance witnesses for an infinite number of strategies in the chain (T n ) n∈N . Let ρ be an outcome of G such that h N T ρ is compatible with T N T and yields the antagonistic value aVal(h N T , T N T ). We consider the valid pathh N T in G × T that follows the behaviour of T N T over the history h, the valid pathĥ N T in M × G × T that follows the behaviour of M and T N T over the history h, and the valid pathρ in G × T that follows the behaviour of T N T over the outcome ρ. We have one of the following: either (a) |h N Tρ | g = 0 or (b) |h N Tρ | r ≥ 1. We show now how to construct new non-dominance witnesses:
(a) Assume that |h N Tρ | g < N T . Then we know that h N T is also a non-dominance witness for M and T n for all n ≥ N with N = |h N Tρ | g . Indeed, by Lemma 38, the outcome h N T ρ is compatible with every strategy realized by T initialized with a counter value at least equal to the number of green transitions inh N Tρ , that is, N . Furthermore, for n ≥ N , we have that aVal
. Hence, the history h N T is also a non-dominance witness for M and T n . There are infinitely many n such that n > N , thus we obtain that M (T n ) n∈N . (b) Assume now that |h N Tρ | g ≥ N T = |G||T |(|M| + 1) + 1. Then at least one of the two following properties is verified: either |h N T | g > |M||G||T | and we expose a loop inĥ N T , or |ρ| g > |G||T | and we expose a loop inρ. In both cases we construct non-dominance witnesses by iterating the loop. Since h N T is compatible with M and last(ĥ loop ) = last(ĥ 1 ) ∈ M × G × T , we know that h k is compatible with the strategy M for any integer k. Moreover, all continuation paths after h N T for M are also available after h k , and conversely, hence cVal(h N T , M ) = cVal(h k , M ). Furthermore, by Lemma 38 we have that h k is compatible with T n k , where n k = N T + k|ĥ loop | g . Thus, we have T n k (h k ) = T N T (h N T ), and it follows that T n k (h k ) = M (h k ). Finally, since h k ρ is compatible with 
Assume that |h
N T | g > |M||G||T |.T n k , aVal(h k , T n k ) ≤ p i (h k ρ) = p i (h N T ρ) = aVal(h N T , T N T ). As cVal(h k , M ) = cVal(h N T , M ) > aVal(h N T , T N T ),
we have T n k (h N T ) = T N T (h N T ), and it follows that T n
That is, by Lemma 24, h N T is a non-dominance witness of M by T n k . Once again, there are infinitely many such T n k , thus we can conclude that M (T n ) n∈N .
Proof of Proposition 40.4. Let us suppose that (S n ) n∈N (T n ) n∈N . For every n ∈ N, let M n := |G||T |(|S n | + 1) + 1, where S n denote the Mealy automaton derived from S that realizes the strategy S n . Then there exists n ∈ N satisfying S n (T n ) n∈N , hence, by Proposition 40.3, S n T Mn . Let k be the smallest integer satisfying S k T M k .
If k ≤ N S , we can conclude the proof immediatly. Indeed, since (S n ) n∈N is a chain by supposition, S k S N S , and then S k (T n ) n∈N implies S N S (T n ) n∈N . Now, let us suppose, towards building a contradiction, that k > N S . Note that, by Proposition 40.3, we know that S k (T n ) n∈N . Therefore, for all n ∈ N, we have S k T n . In particular, S k T 2M k . By Lemma 24, there exists a non-dominance witness h of S k by T 2M k such that h is compatible with S k and T 2M k , S k (h) = T 2M k (h) and cVal(h, S k ) > aVal(h, T 2M k ). Let c = cVal(h, S k ) and a = aVal(h, T 2M k ). Consider now a continuation path ρ such that the outcome hρ is compatible with S k and p i (hρ) = c, and a continuation path ρ such that the outcome hρ is compatible with T 2M k and p i (hρ ) = a.
We consider the valid pathh in G × T that follows the behaviour of S k over the history h, the valid pathĥ in S × G × T that follows the behaviour of S k and T 2M k over the history h, and the valid pathρ in G × S that follows the behaviour of S k over the outcome ρ. We distinguish the following two cases: either (a) |hρ| g < N S or (b) |hρ| g ≥ N S .
(a) Assume that |hρ| g < N S . Let k := k − |hρ| g . By Lemma 38, we know that the outcome Theorem 42. Given a generalised safety/reachability game and a parameterized automaton, we can decide in PTime whether the automaton realizes a chain of strategies.
Similarly, the property P 3 can be decided in PTime by applying Lemma 39 with M and the Mealy automaton corresponding to the strategy T N T as parameters. Moreover, by Proposition 40.3, the problem of deciding property P 4 can be reduced in polynomial time to the problem of deciding property P 3 . Therefore Proposition 40.4 implies our final decidability result.
Theorem 43. Given a generalised safety/reachability game and two parameterized automata realizing uniform chains of strategies, we can decide in PTime whether the chain realized by the first is dominated by the one from the second.
5
Conclusions and outlook
We have observed that admissibility is lacking as a rationality criterion for infinite sequential games with quantitative payoffs. Our primary counterexample suggests that chains of strategies could provide a suitable framework to circumvent this issue. Abstract ordertheoretic considerations revealed that in the most general case, this does not work. However, if we restrict to countable collections of strategies, every chain is below a maximal chain. This restriction is very natural in a TCS setting. A more in-depth exploration of the game-theoretic merits of such a notion of rationality based on chains of strategies is left for the future. We explored the abstract approach in the concrete setting of generalized safety/reachability games. Here, parameterized automata can give a very concrete meaning to chains of strategies. Several fundamental algorithmic questions are decidable in PTime. There are more algorithmic questions to investigate. Moreover, the generalization of our results from generalized safety/reachability games to games with ω-regular objectives seems achievable -our proofs make only very limited use of the special features of the former. Both these endeavours could benefit from a better understanding of parameterized automata in general.
